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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOVEREIGNTY
REINTERPRETATION IN MEXICO*
ERNESTO HERNANDEZ-L6PEZ**
Can national experiences with international migration influence
how domestic law applies the concept of sovereignty?' Yes. Recent
* This essay was presented as part of a panel titled "Immigration Without Rep-
resentation" at the 2006 Western Law Professor of Color Conference, held at Cali-
fornia Western School of Law, March 31-April 2, 2006.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, and
Research Fellow, Center for Global Trade and Development. Research for this es-
say was generously supported by a Faculty Research Stipend from the Chapman
University School of Law. The author thanks Maria Isabel Medina and John Tehra-
nian for providing insightful comments and line-by-line readings of prior drafts;
Norma Ang of the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., for her informative and
generous descriptions; Tony Arnold, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Jorge Chabat, Wayne
Cornelius, Kevin Johnson, Donald Kochan, Susan Martin, Douglas Massey, Marc.
R. Rosenblum, Fernando Thson, Lilia Vasquez, and Stephen Zamora for their sub-
stantive suggestions; participants from the Chapman University School of Law
COTES faculty forum 2005, Western Law Professors of Color Conference 2006,
Biennial Immigration Law Teachers Workshop 2006, and LatCrit South-North Ex-
change 2006 on Theory, Culture and Law for their comments; Research Assistants
Daniel Kim and Andrea Suarez for their dedicated support and helpful suggestions;
and the staff of the Rinker Law Library for their diligent efforts. Any errors are
solely the author's.
1. This essay defines "sovereignty" as the "final political and legal authority,"
a definition taken from F.H. Hinsley's comprehensive historical study of sover-
eignty. He explains, "[S]overeignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute
political authority in the political community; and everything that needs to be added
to complete the definition is added if this statement is continued in the following
words: 'and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere."' F.H. HINSLEY,
SOVEREIGNTY 26 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1966). For this essay, the
norm of non-intervention classifies a country's authority over immigration as within
its domestic jurisdiction and is the final and absolute authority regarding their treat-
ment. In this essay, "sovereignty" is synonymous with "international sovereignty,"
which is different than "sovereignty" in a domestic legal system as between central
and regional state authority.
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developments in Mexico's doctrine of non-intervention within its for-
eign relations law suggest that transnational forces, in this case mi-
grant-sending, influence the application of sovereignty concepts.2
Based on the concept of international sovereignty and included in Ar-
ticle 89:X of Mexico's Constitution, the international law norm of
non-intervention prohibits a country's foreign relations from interfer-
ing in another country's domestic affairs. 3 Under traditional sover-
eignty reasoning, the norm of non-intervention prohibited Mexico
from creating foreign policy directly addressing Mexican migrants in
the United States because such a foreign policy would "intervene in
U.S. jurisdiction."4
This essay's central claim is that recent developments suggest
Mexican foreign relations law applies the sovereignty-based legal doc-
trine in less absolute and traditional manners.5 These changes are the
2. The norm of non-intervention delineates where a government's authority is
allocated when a country conducts its foreign relations. In Mexico, this determina-
tion of where to allocate governmental authority is made by the Executive branch.
This branch exercises foreign relations power, through power generated by Article
89 of the Constitution, which is the Constitutions Chapter III "Executive power."
Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,
Articulo 89:X, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 11 de Mayo de 1988 (Mex.)
(labeling this power as the power "to conduct foreign relations and establish interna-
tional treaties"(author's translation)).
3. Id. Article 89 governs how the Executive may conduct Mexico's foreign
relations. As such, this essay labels this article as within Mexico's foreign relations
law. Foreign relations law addresses Mexican nationals outside Mexico's territory,
since this legal regime focuses on events abroad or overseas.
4. In this essay, "sovereignty application" and "sovereignty reasoning" refer to
how legal doctrines use the concept of final legal authority (sovereignty). "Sover-
eignty-based legal doctrine" refers to legal norms that are justified with claims of
final legal authority and exist because the government making these claims is a sov-
ereign nation. For this essay, "absolute sovereignty" and "traditional sovereignty"
both refer to the characterization of sovereignty as exclusive, autonomous, and inde-
pendent authority. "Country" refers to what is often termed a "nation-state" or an
independent political member of the international community. Because the author
defines "nation" in terms of culture, race, religion, ethnicity and other commonly
held attributes that can vary greatly within a state or political entity, the term "na-
tion-state" is not used. Even though it is arguable which political entities have in-
ternational sovereignty, for simplicity, this essay assumes countries are the only po-
litical entities with international sovereignty.
5. Free trade measures and international agreements between Mexico and the
United States, and the resulting integration, has incited a discussion of whether there
204 [Vol. 43
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result of a "transnational influence," which occurs when sovereign au-
thority is conceptualized to include the interests of actors outside na-
tional borders. In 2001, Mexico conducted its most active campaign
to lobby U.S. lawmakers for reforms to U.S. immigration laws. The
developments are the opposite of the non-intervention doctrine's tradi-
tional reasoning, indicating that foreign relations may influence other
countries' domestic affairs.
This essay highlights how traditional sovereignty reasoning, e.g.
absolute sovereignty, in Mexico has been replaced by a more transna-
tional interpretation of sovereignty. 6 Over the last decade, Mexico's
efforts to influence U.S. lawmaking indicate transnational elements in
sovereignty conceptions. This shift is eye-catching because the non-
intervention doctrine is based on ideas of absolute sovereignty. Con-
ceived as a nineteenth-century application of sovereignty concepts,
will be changes in sovereignty for the two neighbors. See Joyce Hoebing et al.,
Preface to NAFTA AND SOVEREIGNTY: TRADE-OFFS FOR CANADA, MEXICO, AND
THE UNITED STATES, i, xi (Joyce Hoebing et al. eds., 1996); Stephen Zamora, Sym-
posium International Law in the Americas: Rethinking National Sovereignty in an
Age of Regional Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997). Similarly, scholarly and
activist perspectives on antisubordination, often from the southern/periphery, ethnic
minority, gendered, or racially discriminated perspectives, convincingly question
whether there can be changes to sovereignty in international law. See Berta
Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, International Law, Human Rights, and Latcrit The-
ory: Civil and Political Rights-An Introduction, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
223, 239-40 (1997); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights, and
Latcrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177, 186-87 (1997).
6. This essay focuses on how a sovereignty-based legal doctrine, non-
intervention, is applied differently as its reasoning changes over time. The sover-
eignty-focus of this essay relates solely to migration and foreign relations and not to
other sovereign powers such as defense, war powers, or delegation of state (re-
gional) versus federal (central) authority. International migration is a transnational
force because it intrinsically involves people crossing national borders. Because in-
ternational migration changes how sovereignty concepts are applied and reasoned
and because the motivation for these changes is to benefit migrants, this essay labels
these changed applications as a "transnational influence." A "transnational influ-
ence" happens when sovereign authority is conceptualized to include the concerns of
events or actors across national borders. Because the movement of people across
borders to receiving societies, and from sending societies, has produced changes in
legal doctrines, international migration is characterized as having a transnational in-
fluence. See generally JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998) (pre-
senting a current use of traditional sovereignty definitions and absolute sovereignty
reasoning).
2006]
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non-intervention seeks to exclude foreign influence in domestic is-
sues.7 Ultimately, non-intervention is supposed to protect independent
and autonomous sovereign authority from external threats.' The tradi-
tional application of non-intervention delineated sovereign authority
as any issue within domestic jurisdiction. If an issue fell within do-
mestic jurisdiction, another country could not, in theory, intervene.
Currently, more transnational elements characterize the limits of sov-
ereign authority.
This essay provides an introductory observation on how interna-
tional migration influences a shift in sovereignty reasoning-from ab-
solute reasoning to more transnational reasoning-in Mexican foreign
relations law.9 It argues that an understanding of international migra-
tion (the socio-economic process of people moving across national
borders) portrays the reality that international law in Mexico attempts
to govern. 10 International migration is described as a transnational
7. See Fernando Tes6n, Changing Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and
Intervention, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY 29, 30 (Tom Farer ed., 1996) (explaining
that prohibited intervention is "coercive" but not necessarily forcible and "the ends
of the intervention must be to influence another state on a matter falling under the
state's domestic jurisdiction"); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of In-
tervention in International Law, in EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION
91, 91 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen eds., 1993) (explaining "intervention's" gen-
eral meaning in international law as "an improper interference by an outside power
with the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.").
8. See Marc Trachtenberg, Intervention in Historical Perspective, in EMERGING
NORMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION, supra note 7, at 15, 15 (discussing the history
of intervention); Damrosch, supra note 7, at 91 (explaining that the legal rules
against intervention are seen as safeguards against abuses of power).
9. See generally Jorge Chabat, Mexico's Foreign Policy After NAFTA: The
Tools of Interdependence, in BRIDGING THE BORDER: TRANSFORMING MEXICO-U.S.
RELATIONS 33 (Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Jesfis Velasco eds., 1997) (describing the
process that predicts how increased interdependency between Mexico and the
United States would result in changes to the doctrine of non-intervention in Mexican
law).
10. This essay takes a similar position to that of Professor Paul Schiff Berman
stating that an academic focus on sovereignty (how it is defined, what it is, and what
it should be) may not further an understanding of transnational "norm development
and governance." Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Global-
ization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 530 (2005). This is because the actors
involved often lack official or real power/force and the relevant dynamic encom-
passes more than one country. See id, at 523-30. Professor Kal Raustiala provides a
similarly innovative concept stressing that sovereignty and territoriality are "at
[Vol. 43206
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subject, meaning its effects are felt across national boundaries and ex-
perienced in both origin and destination countries. U.S. experiences
with international migration are primarily as a receiving country,
while Mexico's experiences are as a sending country." This essay's
transnational lens is comprised of one social phenomenon (interna-
tional migration), one international law concept (sovereignty), and one
interaction (how the social phenomenon influences legal reasoning).' 2
It tracks migration and charts changes in sovereignty-reasoning from
Mexico's migrant-sending loci.
To prove these claims, Section I presents how immigration should
be studied as a transnational subject because its effects are experi-
enced in both sending and receiving countries. This approach helps
identify how changes in the non-intervention doctrine are deviations
in applying absolute sovereignty reasoning, and suggests instead that
there is a current transnational influence in this reasoning. Section II
describes how the Mexican non-intervention doctrine is based on ab-
solute sovereignty ideals. It envisions sovereign authority over immi-
grants in national territory and domestic law-making or migrant regu-
lation, as exclusive and without limitations. Domestic jurisdictions set
these limits as exclusive. Mexico's foreign relations law envisioned
sovereignty in these traditional terms.1 3 Section III reports how Mexi-
can foreign relations law has reinterpreted the norm of non-
intervention and applied it differently. Traditionally, the norm re-
odds" with contemporary legal doctrines and the exercise of jurisdiction. Kal Ruas-
tiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2504 (2005).
11. While not a focus of this essay, this does not suggest that Mexico only
sends migrants and the United States only receives migrants. Both countries' legal
systems are influenced by their respective emigration and immigration experiences.
12. This transnational focus is in the spirit of Kim Barry's research on emigra-
tion and "external citizenship." See generally Kim Barry, Home and Away: The
Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006).
Barry's research examines how the concept of citizenship exists even though citi-
zens may emigrate from the territory of the country of which they are citizens. See
id. at 20-34. In this essay, emigration, as studied by Barry, is Mexico's sending-
experience. Similar to Barry's analytical focus on emigration and citizenship, this
essay focuses on emigration and sovereignty.
13. The norm of non-intervention has changed in the humanitarian intervention
context as well. International law has evolved to recognize distinctions between na-
tional and international jurisdiction, and in certain circumstances, intervention for
humanitarian reasons is not regarded as breaching the norm of non-intervention. See
generally Tes6n, supra note 7.
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suited in Mexico's "policy of no-policy," with Mexico failing to ad-
vocate for its nationals overseas. Since the mid-1990s, Mexican for-
eign relations have deviated from this rigid interpretation with aggres-
sive lobbying of U.S. lawmakers for changes to U.S. immigration law,
an active program representing migrants through Mexican consulates,
representing migrant and Mexican concerns to U.S. policy makers,
and seeking an immigration agreement with the United States.' 4 Sec-
tion IV concludes by analytically incorporating doctrinal changes in
Mexican law with a transnational analysis of sovereignty concepts.
I. MIGRATION: TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECTS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 5
This essay uses a transnational perspective to examine how sover-
eignty reasoning changes in Mexican law.16 The case of Mexican mi-
gration to the United States is ripe for transnational analysis because
emigration from Mexico is such a sustained and influential activity.
14. Due to concerns of brevity, this essay does not elaborate on other important
legal changes in Mexico that reinterpret the norm of non-intervention. For instance,
Mexico eliminated restrictions in its nationality law, effectively permitting dual-
nationality. This confirmed that Mexican nationals would not lose or have to relin-
quish their Mexican nationality if they became naturalized United States citizens.
These changes were instituted to permit Mexicans abroad and specifically in the
United States to retain links with Mexico. A central objective of Mexican policy
makers was that these dual-national Mexican citizens could vote in U.S. elections, as
U.S. citizens, and influence U.S. immigration policy. For a detailed description of
these changes, see generally David Fitzgerald, Rethinking Emigrant Citizenship, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 90 (2006).
15. This essay takes inspiration from Berman's examination of how interna-
tional legal norms are disseminated, drawing interdisciplinary insight from interna-
tional relations theory, anthropology, sociology, critical geography, and cultural
studies disciplines. Berman, supra note 10. These disciplines explain how "people
actually form affiliations, construct communities, and receive and develop legal
norms, often with little regard for the fixed geographical boundaries of the nation-
state system." Id. at 489-90. This essay embraces perspectives and findings from
the migration studies and international relations disciplines.
16. Professor Ediberto Roman suggests a similar transnational analysis for
Latina/o issues in the Americas. Ediberto Roman, Latcrit VI, Outside Jurisprudence
andLooking Beyond Imagined Borders, 55 FLA. L. REv. 583 (2003). Professor Enid
Tricios-Haynes makes similar suggestions looking at migration and sovereignty as
having transnational influences. See generally Enid Trucios-Haynes, Latcrit Theory
And International Civil And Political Rights: The Roleof Transnational Identity And
Migration, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 293 (1996-1997).
208 [Vol. 43
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Mexico's population in the United States is estimated to be 9.9 mil-
lion, with an additional 16.8 million persons born in the United States
claiming Mexican ancestry, and 98.7% of all Mexicans emigrating
have the United States as their destination. 17 Such focused emigration
from Mexico and constant immigration to the United States provides a
canvas to apply transnational analysis, examining the effects of emi-
gration and immigration on domestic law. A transnational analysis
permits studying one legal concept, sovereignty, and how international
migration influences changes in domestic law's interpretation of sov-
ereignty. Countries have different migration experiences, from mi-
grant-receiving and migrant-sending contexts. These contexts influ-
ence change in sovereignty-reasoning in domestic law.18 This section
provides a working definition of transnational analysis, applies it to
the migration-sending context, and identifies transnational influences
in how sovereignty is currently reasoned within Mexico's non-
intervention doctrine.
Definitions of "transnationalism" for immigration purposes gener-
ally refer to migrants (the people who cross international borders) and
migration (the act of crossing) as having political, cultural, social, and
economic relationships in sending and receiving societies, e.g. coun-
tries of departure/origin/home and countries of arri-
val/destination/host. 19 This analysis is beneficial because it examines
17. Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 91 n.2 (summarizing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET
AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END
OF THE MILLENNIUM 73 (1998) and CONSEJO NACIONAL DE POBLACI6N, Migraci6n
Mexicana Hacia Estados Unidos, www.conapo.gob.mx/migint/03.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006)).
18. This legal examination follows paths suggested by Saskia Sassen and
Cheryl Shanks who, from social science perspectives, independently conclude that
migration changes international sovereignty. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING
CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996) (explaining how
the global movement of capital and people indicates sovereignty is no longer con-
fined to the nation-state); CHERYL SHANKS, IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF
AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY, 1890-1990 (2001) (explaining how changes in U.S. im-
migration policy, and their justifications, are responses to perceived threats to U.S.
sovereignty).
19. Although these terms are heavily debated, this essay only elucidates there
are two separate countries where sovereignty reasoning is being influenced by mi-
gration, with terms "departure," "origin," "home," and "sending" referring to the
same country and "arrival," "destination," "host," and "receiving" referring to the
same country. Rainer Baubock suggests "political transnationalism" includes how
2006] 209
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relationships and consequences in both the localities where migrants
departed from and the localities where migrants currently reside. Ap-
plying this analysis from the social, economic, or political disciplines
to legal scholarship is beneficial because its highlights how national
legal systems are influenced by foreign forces. This analysis shows
how different national legal systems face similar, but not identical,
experiences when addressing migration. A key assumption of this es-
say is that legal regimes in both Mexico and the United States are in-
fluenced by migration even though their experiences as sending and
receiving countries vary.20 Alejandro Portes builds on this by arguing
that when government policies are transnational they are reacting to,
and thus occur after, popular transnational activity.2' This results in a
sense of agency in political change in sending and receiving societies
for migration and migrants. 22 Transnational social science research on
migration between Mexico and the United States is quite sophisti-
cated, inspiring similar legal doctrine analysis.23 For a legal focus,
migration influences political change in host and origin countries, with migrants
having "overlapping memberships" in independent and territorially separated poli-
ties. See Rainer Baubock, Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism,
37 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 700, 700-02 (2003). Linda Basch et al. define "'transna-
tionalism' as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded
social relations that link to together their societies of origin and settlement" which
"cross geographic, cultural, and political borders." LINDA BASCH ET AL., NATIONS
UNBOUND: TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS, POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENTS, AND
DETERRITORIALIZED NATION STATES 7 (1994).
20. For a discussion of how international relations and domestic social perspec-
tives on migrants may influence how sovereignty, as expressed in the plenary power
doctrine, influences recent U.S. judicial immigration lawmaking, see Peter Spiro,
Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340 (2002).
21. Alejandro Portes, Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical
Evidence in the Study of Immigration Transnationalism, 37 INT'L MIGRATION REV.
874 (2003). "Popular activity" refers to efforts led not by governments or political
entities but by persons who are not acting in representation or in the duty of a state.
Portes' transnational examples include new cultural practices brought on by mi-
grants changing value systems, migrants becoming the equivalent of economic ex-
ports for migrant sending countries, migrants' political influence in origin and host
countries, and the sending countries' increasing adoption of dual nationality and
dual citizenship regimes. See id. at 878-80.
22. See id. at 875-76 (describing transnationalism in migration as a "grassroots
phenomenon").
23. One example is David Fitzgerald's analysis of dual nationality and legal
voting rights for Mexicans abroad and the corresponding influence of links between
[Vol. 43210
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss1/10
SOVEREIGNTY REINTERPRETATION IN MEXICO
Judge Philip Jessup defines "transnational law" as "law which regu-
lates actions or events that transcend national frontiers." 24 This differs
from studying national law (rules belonging to one country) or inter-
national law (rules governing interactions between countries).
Taking these claims, that migrants have a political influence in
both sending and receiving societies, governmental action promoting
transnationalism responds to popular activity, and domestic law may
have a transnational focus, this essay asks: is there a transnational in-
fluence in the law used to regulate migration from Mexico? This in-
quiry gains significance because the legal doctrine governing migrant-
sending is based on legal assumptions squarely rejecting transnational-
ism. Mexican foreign relations law is based on absolute sovereignty
concepts in the doctrine of non-intervention. 25 Absolute sovereignty
claims a sovereign country's authority is exclusive and independent.2 6
communities located in United States and Mexican territories. See DAVID
FITZGERALD, NEGOTIATING EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CITIZENSHIP (2000); David Fitz-
gerald, "For 118 Million Mexicans:" Emigrants and Chicanos in Mexican Politics,
in DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 523 (Kevin Middlebrook ed.,
2004); Fitzgerald, supra note 14. Another example is Marc Rosenblum's research
on the interaction between domestic and international interests in U.S. immigration
policy and Mexican foreign policy on migration. MARC. R. ROSENBLUM, THE
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY (2004) [hereinafter
ROSENBLUM, TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS]; Marc R. Rosenblum, Moving Beyond the
Policy of No Policy: Emigration from Mexico and Central America, 46 LATIN AM.
POL. AND SOC'Y 91 (2004) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Moving Beyond]. A third ex-
ample is Robert Smith's ethnographic analysis of sustained links and leaving and
returning in Mexican migrant communities in New York and Puebla, Mexico. See
ROBERT C. SMITH, MEXICAN NEW YORK: TRANSNATIONAL LIVES OF NEW
IMMIGRANTS (2006).
24. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
25. Rafil Benitez Manaut, Sovereignty, Foreign Policy, and National Security
in Mexico, 1821-1989, in NATURAL ALLIES? CANADIAN AND MEXICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 60 (H.P. Klepak ed., 1996).
26. See Tom Farer, Introduction to BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 7, at 5-
8; Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV.
965, 1002-10 (describing how characterizations of absolute authority are common in
the historic international law development of the concept of sovereignty); Meredith
K. Olafson, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the Immigration Law Plenary
Power Doctrine, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 437-39 (1999); Rosario Green & Peter
Smith, Introduction to FOREIGN POLICY IN U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS 1, 7 (Rosario
Green & Peter Smith eds., 1989) (explaining that historically Mexican foreign rela-
tions emphasized international juridical order as the "most effective means of de-
2006]
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This rejects tolerating any transnational influence. Put bluntly, a
transnational subject is governed by a legal regime based on rejecting
transnationalism. 27 This inquiry gains historical relevance because
non-intervention was developed over a century ago, when migration
was not regarded as having transnational effects, and sovereignty pri-
marily valued autonomous and absolute authority.28
fending sovereignty and integrity of Mexico and of other nations, especially weaker
countries in the world").
27. For instance, migration from Mexico to the United States is a transnational
force, because migrants relocate to the United States and their influence transcends
national borders. Their influence does not remain solely within the United States,
where they are physically located. Migrants may earn income and live in the United
States, but they send funds back home and retain close cultural, social, and political
links with Mexico. Many Mexican domestic contexts, from politics to economics,
depend on influence from across national borders, brought on by this migration.
Mexican foreign relations law governs or seeks to influence immigration. This legal
regime, though, is based on absolute sovereignty, i.e. non-intervention. This tradi-
tional conception of sovereignty classifies a sovereign's authority as exclusive and
autonomous, thereby rejecting any influence from across a national border.
28. Notions of absolute sovereignty have changed in the last century with the
increased importance of individual human rights after the Nuremburg trials, as well
as with the increase in relations and interdependency between countries. See Farer,
supra note 26 at 7-8. The non-intervention doctrine was developed in the nineteenth
century, when Mexico and the United States sought international legitimacy and
centralized legal authority and international law primarily valued autonomy and in-
dependence (to the exclusion of shared authority or international cooperation).
These doctrines were developed when each country's geopolitical and international
law contexts mandated absolute conceptions of sovereignty. But currently interna-
tional relations increasingly value interdependency and sharing elements of sover-
eign authority. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004) (examining the possibility of countries sharing and cooperating through net-
works to promote global governances). For an excellent analysis of how non-
intervention has decreased in importance in U.S.-Mexican relations due to increased
interdependence and cooperation between the two countries see generally Thomas J.
Biersteker, The Rebordering of North America?: Implications for Conceptualizing
Borders after September 11, in THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AMERICA:
INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION IN A NEW SECURITY CONTEXT 153 (Peter Andreas &
Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2003).
10
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II. ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY IN NON-INTERVENTION
A country's authority to regulate migration and to conduct foreign
relations derives from its international sovereignty. 29  Non-
intervention was conceived in the nineteenth century as a legal appli-
cation of absolute sovereignty.30 When the doctrine was developed,
legal definitions of sovereignty primarily focused on absolute descrip-
tions of this authority.31 "Absolute sovereignty" refers to a definition
of sovereignty as exclusive, autonomous, and independent authority.
32
To violate this authority is to share, limit, question, or interfere with it.
Non-intervention is an application of traditional sovereignty because it
regards a sovereign nation's authority as within its domestic jurisdic-
tion as independent and exclusive which should not be subject to for-
eign influence. 33 By setting absolute and exclusive demarcations,
non-intervention exemplifies a traditional sovereignty application.
With these strict lines, non-intervention protected absolute sovereignty
from the external threats of another country interfering in domestic af-
fairs.
For over a century, the doctrine of non-intervention determined
numerous foreign policy decisions in Mexico. 34 Codified in Article
89 paragraph IX of Mexico's Constitution, the norm of non-
intervention prohibits Mexico from interfering in another country's
29. These powers are articulated as the power to have foreign relations and the
power to regulate the entry and removal of foreign nationals. "Under international
law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, un-
der the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to en-
gage in, formal relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987). See generally Thomas C. Heller & Abra-
ham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty: The Practitioners' Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES 24 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 2001) (giving background on the concept of sovereignty).
30. Trachtenberg, supra note 8, at 15-16. See generally ANN VAN WYNEN
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN
THE AMERICAS (1956).
31. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 77.
32. Id.
33. Tes6n, supra note 7, at 29.
34. See Green & Smith, supra note 26, at 7. See generally Manaut, supra note
25 (discussing the history and evolution of Mexico's concept of national security).
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domestic affairs.3 1 Using concepts of traditional sovereignty, Mexico
developed a "policy of no-policy" regarding its emigrants in the
United States. 36 Mexico reasoned that a foreign policy on migrants
intervened in U.S. jurisdiction because the United States possessed
sovereign authority to govern aliens in its national territory.37 With a
traditional application by Mexico, U.S. jurisdiction over migrants
meant U.S. sovereignty required an exclusive and independent exer-
cise of this authority.3 8 Thus, a Mexican foreign policy on migrants in
the United States would violate the norm of non-intervention and U.S.
and international sovereignty.
The international law norm of non-intervention was conceived as
an outgrowth of absolute sovereignty, by prohibiting one country from
influencing or interfering in the affairs of another country.39 Coun-
tries followed the principle to avoid forcible (military or violent) and
non-forcible (non-violent and often political) interference. 40  Nine-
teenth century international law scholars proclaimed, with the Mon-
roe, Calvo, and Drago doctrines, the norm in reaction to European in-
35. Alonso G6mez-Robledo Verduzco, Mexican Foreign Policy: Its Funda-
mental Principals, MEX. L. REv. No. 3, (2005), available at http://info8. juridi-
cas.unam.mx/cont/3/arc/arc5.htm.
36. Carlos Rico F. explains that after the Bracero program (1942-62) (in which
the United States invited Mexican influence) Mexico's decision not to intervene was
due "to respect [for] the 'sovereign right' of the United States to pass legislation on
this question without attempting to influence the U.S. policymaking process." Car-
los Rico F., The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and Mexican Percep-
tions of Bilateral Approaches to Immigration Issues, in IMMIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE 1986 IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
(IRCA) 90, 95 (George Vernez ed., 1990).
37. Carlos GonzAlez Guiti6rrez, Decentralized Diplomacy: The Role of Consu-
lar Offices in Mexico's Relations with its Diaspora, in BRIDGING THE BORDER:
TRANSFORMING MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS, supra note 9, at 49, 49-50; Christopher
Mitchell, The Future of Migration as an Issue in Inter-American Relations, in THE
FUTURE OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS 217, 227 (Jorge I. Dominguez ed., 2000);
Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23, at 108-09.
38. See Jorge Chabat, The Making of Mexican Policy Toward the United
States, in FOREIGN POLICY IN U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 73, 78.
39. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
40. See Heman Vales, The Latin American View of the Doctrine of Humanitar-
ian Intervention, J. OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, Feb. 11, 2001,
www.jha.ac/articles/a064.htm.
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terventions (both imperial and economic) in the Western Hemi-
sphere.4 ' If an issue fell within one country's jurisdiction, any foreign
policy by another country on that issue breached the norm. 2 Out of a
concern for sovereignty, countries applied the norm in their foreign re-
lations.43 In a traditional sense, acountry's sovereignty was absolute,
unshared, and autonomous for regulating its borders and the entry of
persons into its national territory. This traditional reasoning guided
Mexico to avert intervening in U.S. affairs, resulting in Mexico not at-
tempting to influence U.S. policy on its migrants.4
The most recent articulation of the norm is in amendment X to Ar-
ticle 89 of the Mexican Constitution. Article 89:X presents seven
"normative principles" including non-intervention, which the Execu-
tive Power observes in conducting Mexico's foreign relations.4a
Amendment X's other six principles include self-determination of na-
tions, peaceful solutions to controversies, banishment of threat of or
use of force in international relations, legal equality of states, interna-
tional cooperation for development, and struggling for peace and in-
ternaiona secrity 46ternational security. 6 Mexico's foreign policy has historically been
characterized by an overly normative and doctrinal foCUS.4 7 Mexican
legal theorists and policymakers first applied the norm of non-
41. See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 55-64.
42. Id. at 15-16.
43. Id.
44. See generally Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23.
45. Article 89:X was included in 1988 to align Mexico's foreign relations au-
thority with contemporary international law. Verduzco, supra note 35. Mexico's
Constitutional framework for the Executive power is contained in Articles 80 to 93.
Article 89 specifically assigns Executive powers such as the power to execute laws
passed by Congress, declare war, name cabinet members, and, with approval from
the senate, to conduct foreign relations and conclude treaties. STEPHEN ZAMORA ET
AL., MEXICAN LAW 14,142 (2004).
46. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as
amended, Articulo 89:X, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 11 de Mayo de
1988.
47. Mexican foreign policy was traditionally reduced "to a simple enumeration
of principles," such as self-determination, political sovereignty, non-intervention,
legal equality, international cooperation, and human rights. Guadalupe Gonzilez,
The Foundations of Mexico's Foreign Policy: Old Attitudes and New Realities, in
FOREIGN POLICY IN U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 21, 25.
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intervention in the mid-nineteenth century.48 Geopolitical concerns of
an expansionary neighbor and European countries' being active in
domestic politics and economics influenced Mexico to interpret sover-
eignty as independent authority. 49 Mexico defined international sov-
ereignty as autonomy and legal equality among countries.5 °
Initially, non-intervention for Mexico focused on protecting itself
from the interference of foreign powers.5 1 With this reasoning, the
principle was included in Mexico's foreign relations.52 The objective
was that other countries' non-intervention in Mexican affairs would be
reciprocated by Mexico's non-intervention in their domestic affairs.53
A basic motive was that Mexico suffered from violations of its sover-
eignty with U.S. and European invasions of its national territory.54
The objective of Mexican foreign policy was to avoid future invasions
of national territory.5 5 It proclaimed concerns for other newly inde-
pendent countries with little military and economic power. 56 Historic
examples of when Mexico protested U.S. intervention in the affairs of
other countries include the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala
in 1954, campaigns against the Cuban revolution of 1959, military
force in the Dominican Republic in 1965, pressures against Salvador
48. See MERCEDES PERENA-GARCiA, LAS RELACIONES DIPLOMATICAS DE
MExico 35-36 (2001). Perena-Garcia explains Mexican foreign policy's primary
goals have been defending national sovereignty and promoting non-intervention. Id.
at 29, 35-36, 53-54.
49. See Manaut, supra note 25, at 60-61; Biersteker, supra note 28, at 153-66
(discussing the implications of September 11 on U.S. border security).
50. Green and Smith explain that Mexico's foreign policy highly values "po-
litical negotiation and compliance with the norms of international law," and its "re-
spect for the international juridical order is the most effective means of defending
the sovereignty and integrity of Mexico and other nations, especially weaker coun-
tries of the world." Green & Smith, supra note 26, at 7.
51. Bernardo Sepfilveda Amor, Los Intereses De La Politica Exterior, in LA
POLITICA INTERNACIONAL DE MtXICO EN EL DECEN1O DE LOS OCHENTA 17, 17, 96-
99 (Cdsar Sepdlveda ed., 1994).
52. See Manaut, supra note 25, at 60-61.
53. Amor, supra note 51, at 96-99.
54. See Manaut, supra note 25, at 60-61; Green & Smith, supra note 26, at 7.
55. Jorge Chabat explains that, for Mexican foreign policy, the "mere expres-
sion of opinion was regarded as an act of meddling," and thus violated the norm of
non-intervention. Chabat, supra note 9, at 35.
56. See Green & Smith, supra note 26, at 8.
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Allende in Chile (1970-73) and Nicaragua after the 1979 revolution,
and the invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.17 Similar
non-intervention protests include when Italy invaded Ethiopia (1935-
36), Japan invaded China (1931-45), Germany annexed Austria
(1939), Russia gained an interest in Finland (1939-40), and the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan (1979-88).58
With this, Mexico conceptually contributed to an international law
framework that protected its own fragile independence. The signifi-
cance of non-intervention in Mexican law becomes apparent by exam-
ining the country's geopolitical history. Mexican independence took
place in 182l.' 9 Transforming from the colony of Nueva Espaha to
the sovereign nation of Mexico, its territory included present-day Gua-
temala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and the U.S. states of Cali-
fornia, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and Texas.
60
By 1848, Mexico lost all of the mentioned territories. These losses
came from wars with foreign countries and from foreign forces inter-
vening in Mexican politics. The losses created a national fear that
there could be future territorial losses or intervention. 61
These ambitions to stop foreign influence and attain domestic in-
dependence appear as normative concepts in international law.6
2
These objectives painted sovereignty as absolute and exclusive, with
countries proclaiming interference in each other's affairs as violations
of their sovereignty. For many countries, the concept of absolute sov-
ereignty was needed to protect their national independence. 63
Non-intervention is an international law concept steeped in his-
torical applications beyond Mexico. Linda Damrosch explains that
the first use of the term "non-intervention" in international law was by
Emerich de Vattel in 1758.64 Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Tho-
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Manaut, supra note 25, at 58.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Mexico's foreign policy has historically been characterized by a normative,
doctrinaire and legalist focus. GonzAlez, supra note 47, at 24.
63. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 30, at xi-xii.
64. Damrosch, supra note 7, at 93 (citing Tomislav Mitrovic, Non-Intervention
in International Affairs of States, in PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 219 (Milan Sahovic ed.
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mas Jr. identify the "birthplace" of the principle of non-intervention in
the classic international law treatises of Christian Wolff and Em-
merich de Vattel. 65 Non-intervention gained conceptual sophistication
with the Calvo and Drago Doctrines. 66 In 1868, Dr. Carlos Calvo, an
acclaimed Argentine scholar, published his treatise Le droit interna-
tional theorique et pratique, which described the principle of non-
intervention.67 Calvo reasoned that European interventions in the
Americas compromised national independence and international sov-
ereignty.68 Coined the Calvo Doctrine, the treatise condemned inter-
vention by foreign powers to collect on international money obliga-
tions such as claims by foreigners for the destruction of property or
claims for unpaid financial obligations. 69 In 1902, Dr. Luis M. Drago,
Argentina's foreign minister, extended the concept to a prohibition of
foreign intervention in order to coerce government payment of its pub-
lic debt.70 Both the Calvo and Drago doctrines illustrate the impor-
tance placed on absolute conceptions of sovereignty to limit foreign
interference in domestic affairs.
The non-intervention norm became a fixture of Mexican foreign
policy. 7' In July 1867, President Benito Juarez declared equality and
1972)).
65. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 5. Wolff emphasized a country's
independency and natural liberty, with countries not having the right to interfere in
the affairs of other countries. Id. Vattel explains that states have their own national
concerns and no foreign power has the right to intervene in these affairs. Id. Non-
intervention gained particular prominence in the Western Hemisphere beginning
with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, prohibiting European interference in Western
Hemispheric affairs. Id. at 10.
66. See generally Luis M. Drago, State Loans in Their Relations to Interna-
tional Policy, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 692 (1907); Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago
Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907).
67. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 56 n.7.
68. Id. at 56-57. In 1826, Sim6n Bolivar (liberator of Colombia, Venezuela,
Panama, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador) pursued a "Treaty of Perpetual Union, League,
and Confederation" between the newly independent [Gran] Colombia, Peru, and
Mexico. Id. at 55-56. Although not ratified, the Treaty had the objective of com-
mon defense of the sovereignty and independence of all these nations against foreign
subjection. Id. at 56.
69. See Hershey, supra note 66.
70. See Drago, supra note 66.
71. See Green & Smith, supra note 26, at 7. Rosario Green and Peter H. Smith
explain that Mexico's foreign policy developed "through the traumatic experiences
218 [Vol. 43
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respect among nations to be a fundamental principle of Mexican for-
eign policy. 72 This developed into the Juarez Doctrine, as Mexico be-
gan to exert a foreign policy amidst an expansionary neighbor and
ever-watchful European forces. In 1913, President Francisco Madero
affirmed the importance of this equality by explaining that relations
between the United States and Mexico should "be based on respect for
the sovereignty, the integrity and dignity of the Mexican Republic." 73
These ambitions later characterized the Carranza Doctrine, which em-
phasized non-intervention and self-determination in international rela-
tions.74 Presidents Juarez and Carranza responded to foreign intrusions
in Mexican affairs. During Juarez's political career, Mexico lost a lar-
ge amount of its territory to the United States in the War of 1848. 75
For Carranza, Mexico was victim to extensive diplomatic and military
intervention by the United States in Mexican territory during the
Mexican Revolution, such as the invasion of Veracruz in 1914 and the
U.S. pursuit of Pancho Villa in 1916.76
In 1931, Foreign Relations Secretary Genaro Estrada developed
another important facet of non-intervention.77 Eventually labeled the
Estrada Doctrine, his objective was for Mexico to remain neutral in
foreign controversies and reject the common practice for countries to
"recogniz[e] foreign governments." 78 Often, European powers and the
United States used this practice of recognition to influence the politi-
of threats to national sovereignty." Id. at 7.
72. Manaut, supra note 25, at 60.
73. Id. at 61 (referring to the doctrine's genesis in President Cenustiano Car-
ranza's declaration to the United States on April 22, 1914).
74. Id. at 62.
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id. at 62-63.
77. See Philip C. Jessup, The Estrada Doctrine, 25 AM. J. INT'L. L. 719, 719-
23 (1931).
78. Jorge Chabat provides this translation of the Estrada Doctrine:
Mexico is not inclined to express recognition because it considers this a
denigrating practice which, besides hurting the sovereignty of other na-
tions, places them in a position in which their internal matters can lead to
remarks by other governments, who have already assumed a critical atti-
tude as they decided, favorably or unfavorably, to judge the legal status of
foreign governments.
Chabat, supra note 9, at 44 (referencing SECRETARiA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES,
GENERO ESTRADA: DIPLOMATICO Y ESCRITOR 135 (Santiago Roel ed., 1978)).
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cal power of a specific actor or political party in another country's
domestic politics. Domestic forces gained or lost political power be-
cause of this foreign influence. Influence was exerted by foreign gov-
ernments recognizing or supporting one domestic interest over an-
other. In developing the doctrine, Mexico instead proclaimed it would
not judge or support any particular political actor in a foreign coun-
try.79
III. MIGRANTS AND MEXICO'S REINTERPRETATION
OF NON-INTERVENTION 80
In Mexico, the traditional sovereignty perspective was that mi-
grants in the United States fell within U.S. jurisdiction because they
were in U.S. territory. 8' How they were treated once they crossed the
international border into the United States was an exclusive issue
within U.S. sovereignty. Accordingly, the norm of non-intervention
applied a traditional version of sovereignty thereby prohibiting any
Mexican influence regarding issues within U.S. jurisdiction. A
change in the non-intervention concept occurred when the Mexican
government stopped considering migrants from Mexico as solely
within U.S. jurisdiction. 82 In the mid-1990s, Mexican foreign policy
79. The objective was to avoid "producing situations where the legal capacity
and national leadership of governments and authorities are subordinated to the opin-
ions of foreigners." Manaut, supra note 25, at 64 (quoting Genero Estrada, Obras
Completas (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1988) 144). The Estrada Doctrine initially started
as official instructions from Foreign Secretary Estrada to the Mexican diplomats
abroad, but became a central and traditional objective of Mexican foreign policy.
See Manaut, supra note 25, at 63-64 (explaining the Doctrine's importance); see
generally Jessup, supra note 77 (explaining the Doctrine's contemporary relevance);
Estrada Doctrine of Recognition, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 203 (1931) (translating Secre-
tary Estrada's instructions first articulating the Doctrine).
80. The greater part of this analysis follows Jorge Chabat's decades of ground-
breaking foreign policy analysis. See Chabat, supra note 9.
81. See generally Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23.
82. See generally Chabat, supra note 38. In 1988, Jorge Chabat explained that
any change to Mexico's foreign policy in becoming more active in representing
Mexican migrants, whether through the consulates or by seeking to influence laws
such as IRCA, would require a change in interpretation of non-intervention. He ex-
plains the norm is a "cornerstone of Mexican foreign policy." Id. at 78. The norm is
included in the Organic Law of Mexican Foreign Service, which forbids foreign ser-
vice officers from intervening "in internal or political affairs of the country to which
220 [Vol. 43
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started to define the treatment of its citizens outside of its national ter-
ritory as a domestic concern.8 3 This determination provided a concep-
tual base to move from "no policy" and to reinterpret the norm of non-
intervention. This section elaborates on four examples since the
1990s in which Mexican foreign relations took sophisticated and nu-
anced approaches to advocating for migrants in the United States.
These approaches seek to influence U.S. lawmaking and, in doing so,
reinterpret the norm of non-intervention by reasoning sovereignty
does not bar this influence.
Mexico's first step from "no-policy" took place when it lobbied
U.S. legislators in response to the proposed legislation that became the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).8 4 IIRIRA eliminated many migrant rights and initiated the
current focus of migration control through border security.85 Sectors
they are assigned or in the country's international affairs not having to do with Mex-
ico." Id. at 78 (citing "Ley Orgdnica del Servicio Exterior Mexicana," Diario Off-
cial, January 8, 1982, Article 48). Traditionally, Mexico did not lobby U.S. law-
makers for immigration reforms because it did not wish to "undermine its principled
political opposition to such U.S. activities in Mexico." JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ &
RAFAEL FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 126 (2001).
83. See Chabat, supra note 9, at 39. The conceptual facilitator to re-interpret
prior notions of non-intervention was a national recognition of interdependency be-
tween Mexico and events outside its borders. This was most evident during the
Presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994). Jorge Chabat explains that
during the Salinas presidency Mexico's foreign relations identified the value of in-
terdependency with the outside world and its foreign policy became more active,
changing the concept of nonintervention and thus sovereignty. See generally Jorge
Chabat, Mexico's Foreign Policy in 1990: Electoral Sovereignty and Integration
with the United States, 33 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1 (1991). From
this, Mexican ideals of sovereignty shifted from a concept highlighting the interna-
tional system's autonomous and absolute authority between countries, to a concept
emphasizing a country's international cooperation, shared authority, and their inter-
dependent relations. Id.
84. Rafael Ferndndez de Castro & Carlos A. Rosales, Migration Issues: Rais-
ing the Stakes in U.S. -Latin American Relation, in THE FUTURE OF INTER-AMERICAN
RELATIONS 237, 247-50 (Jorge I. Dominguez ed., 2000); Rosenblum, Moving Be-
yond, supra note 23, at 111.
85. The comprehensive bill contained provisions that created three- and ten-
year bars to reentry for aliens who were "unlawfully present," expedited removals, a
one-year filing deadline for asylum applications, changes to eligibility for suspen-
sion of deportation, increasing removability classification for alien-criminals, man-
datory detention for immigrants convicted of certain crimes, and statutory limita-
2006]
19
Hernández-López: International Migration and Sovereignty Reinterpretation in Mexic
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
of the U.S. public and lawmakers advocated for measures limiting or
eliminating many rights or benefits enjoyed by migrants in the U.S.86
Many immigration law reformers also called for increased deporta-
tions. 87 The prospect of restrictive reforms in the United States con-
cerned Mexican migrants who, although outside national territory, ex-
erted a large economic influence in Mexico. 88 There was an enormous
fear in Mexico that IIRIRA would result in mass deportations.89
IIRIRA was enacted nearly a decade after the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act in 1986 (IRCA). 90 Mexico did not lobby or at-
tempt to influence U.S. legislators when IRCA was under considera-
tion.91 IRCA's main proponent, Senator Alan Simpson, solicited
support and input from Mexican President Jos6 L6pez Portillo. 92 The
President, however, explained that although immigration reform in the
United States did affect Mexican nationals, Mexico could not have a
policy on this issue because it was the United States' sovereign right.93
President L6pez Portillo told Senator Simpson, who had gone to Mex-
ico to attain support for IRCA, "You have a sovereign right to do what
you want with your borders. But I am glad a man as sensitive as you
appears to be in charge of immigration up there because I want you to
look after our workers. 94
tions to judicial review over immigration law claims. See THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY, 440-42,
446-51, 529-33, 609-16 (5th ed. 2003). See generally Nancy Morawetz, Under-
standing the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Pro-
posed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936 (1999) (outlining the major features of
IIRIRA and arguing for legislative reform efforts to restore individual review by
immigration judges).
86. DOMiNGUEZ & FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, supra note 82, at 153-54.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23, at 111.
89. See DOMiNGUEZ & FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, supra note 82.
90. Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro argue that dialogue between the
United States and Mexico changed this pattern of non-engagement. Id at 33.
91. See Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23, at 107-08.
92. Richard W. Day, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Affairs, Keynote Address at the Conference on the International Effects
of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (May 1988), in IMMIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 36, at 19.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Diego C. Asencio of the Commission for the Study of Interna-
[Vol. 43
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss1/10
SOVEREIGNTY REINTERPRETATION IN MEXICO
In the mid-1990s, Mexico developed an active foreign policy re-
garding its migrants in the United States, through diplomatic and con-
gressional lobbying, seeking to limit IIRIRA's most restrictive meas-
ures. 95 Mexico took a more "hands-on" or active approach to migrant
issues. It focused bilateral consultations on migration issues, which
Mexico had avoided in the past.96 In the preceding years, Mexico
gained extensive, but new, experience lobbying U.S. lawmakers for
NAFTA ratification.97 This effort took place in 1993 and 1994 as
Mexico hired an impressive array of public relations firms, political
consulting firms, and law firms in an effort to ensure that NAFTA
would succeed and be implemented as U.S. law.98 Legally, the ratifi-
cation process required the U.S. Senate to approve the international
treaty in order for it to become United States law.99 The treaty was
negotiated by the executive branches of the United States, Mexico,
and Canada. In a more traditional perspective on non-intervention,
Mexico would have avoided interfering in the U.S. legislative process
and avoided lobbying U.S. lawmakers for NAFTA's passage. The
treaty would have been negotiated without Mexico's active diplomatic
involvement, and securing the treaty's implementation in the United
States would have remained solely a United States domestic concern.
In this light, Mexico taking the step to lobby U.S. legislators repre-
sented a big change. By trying to influence the U.S. lawmaking proc-
ess, Mexico's lobbying was in conflict with its traditional perspectives
on non-intervention. NAFTA involved enormous potential gains for
tional Migration and Cooperative Economic Development).
95. See generally Mitchell, supra note 37, at 219-22; Femrindez de Castro &
Rosales, supra note 84, at 248.
96. DOMINGUEZ & FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, supra note 82, at 33.
97. Todd A. Eisenstadt provides a detailed analysis of Mexico's lobbying ef-
forts, describing them as "one of the most dramatic increases ever in lobbying and
public relations expenditures by a foreign government in Washington," a change
from "one of Washington's most passive foreign players" to "one of the most visi-
ble," and representing estimated costs of $67,229 between 1985 to 1991 to "at least
$9 million." Todd A. Eisenstadt, The Rise of the Mexico Lobby in Washington:
Even Further from God, and Even Closer to the United States, in BRIDGING THE
BORDER, supra note 9, at 89, 89.
98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating the president "shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur").
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Mexico's economy. The Mexican government viewed this as a do-
mestic concern even though securing NAFTA's implementation im-
plied substantial involvement in U.S. lawmaking. 100
Mexico sought to directly influence U.S. lawmaking on immigra-
tion issues beyond diplomatic channels as its foreign policy included
lobbying for changes to IIRIRA. Building on NAFTA lobbying ex-
periences, embassy, congressional, and executive branch liaisons met
with INS, State Department, and Department of Justice officials, and
congressional leaders serving on the Foreign Affairs and Judiciary
Committees. 101 They articulated Mexico's concerns over IIRIRA's
restrictive provisions. Early versions of IIRIRA included the Gallegly
Amendment, which denied school access to the children of undocu-
mented migrants. 10 2 Mexico lobbied for this amendment's exclusion
in the Act's final version.10 3 U.S. President Bill Clinton also lobbied
for the amendment's exclusion and threatened to veto the bill if the
Gallegly amendment was included. 10 4 Mexico's persistent and direct
lobbying is seen as key to President Clinton's position on this
amendment. 105
From an international law lens, a significant shift in sovereignty-
reasoning occurred with Mexico's lobbying. Effectively, Mexico re-
interpreted the norm of non-intervention because it did not regard its
efforts to influence U.S. lawmaking as a violation of the norm. Mex-
ico also moved away from absolute notions of sovereignty in its rea-
soning. In a significant shift, U.S. domestic jurisdiction over migra-
tion was not seen as exclusive. Mexico's participation in the U.S.
legislative process was not impeded by a need to protect U.S. inde-
pendence. Mexico did not view the U.S. legislative process as some-
thing exclusive of autonomous and absolute sovereign power. In-
100. See generally Eisenstadt, supra note 97.
101. Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23, at 111; see DOMiNGUEZ &
FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, supra note 82, at 126-34; Chabat, supra note 9, at 33-47
(explaining how concerns for sovereignty and the doctrinal importance of non-
intervention in Mexican foreign relations inhibited lobbying before NAFTA).
102. Rosenblum, Moving Beyond, supra note 23, at 111.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Mexico's foreign policy incorporating migrants grew out of decades of
governmental networks set up between the United States and Mexican agents, work-
ing on diplomatic and migration issues in the 1975-1995 period. See generally id
[Vol. 43
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss1/10
SOVEREIGNTY REINTERPRETATION IN MEXICO
stead, Mexico could participate because it had a stake in the U.S. leg-
islative process. Here is where a transnational influence in foreign re-
lations law becomes evident. Foreign relations, based on domestic
need, began to look across national borders to justify how to apply the
norm. There is a subtle change from Mexico's non-involvement be-
cause of jurisdictional concerns for U.S. autonomy to a new position
ensuring Mexico attains national benefits by influencing U.S. lawmak-
ing. By seeking to influence U.S. laws, Mexico reinterpreted its norm
of non-intervention. A rigid concern for U.S. jurisdiction would have
prevented influencing U.S. lawmaking. These prior concerns justified
Mexico's "policy of no policy." Under a traditional interpretation of
non-intervention, Mexico would have limited its negotiation to diplo-
macy and not attempted to influence U.S. lawmaking.
A second step in Mexico's reinterpretation of the norm of non-
intervention began in 1990, when it implemented the Program for
Mexican Communities Living in Foreign Countries. This program fell
under the authority of the Secretary of Foreign Relations.10 6 The Pro-
gram's goal was to build relationships between Mexican migrants
abroad, Mexican-Americans in the United States, and the Mexican
government. 07 Migrants in the United States became a central focus
of the program. The Program eventually developed into a method for
allowing the Mexican government to advocate and protect migrants'
political and legal rights.10 8
Before the Program's creation, Mexico's Consulates avoided any
active support or engagement with Mexican migrants in the United
States because of concerns over violating the international law norm
of non-intervention. 10 9 The program's first director, Carlos Gonzdlez
Guiti~rrez explained:
106. See Fernndez de Castro & Rosales, supra note 84, at 249.
107. Id. The program included educational exchange for Mexican teachers
with U.S. schools, migrant community organization in the U.S., preventive health
campaigns, cultural exchanges between home community governments and migrant
organizations, soccer leagues, youth programs, and fund drives for home community
development projects. Carlos Gonzdlez Guiti~rrez, Fostering Identities: Mexico's
Relations with Its Diaspora, 86 J. AM. HIST. 545, 546 (1999).
108. See Ferndndez de Castro & Rosales, supra note 84, at 249.
109. Gonzilez Guitidrrez, supra note 37, at 49.
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The crux of the problem for the consulates was the issue of nonin-
tervention. As the relationship between the two nations has
strengthened, it is becoming more difficult to clearly distinguish
boundaries between domestic and foreign policies. The new func-
tions of the Mexican consular offices are not a cause but rather a re-
flection of this change. " 0
He explains that Mexico's consulate redefined its role to support,
represent, advocate for, and nurture home-nation ties for its mi-
grants."' He adds "this redefinition required [Mexican Consulates] to
surrender their simplistic and preestablished definitions of the princi-
ple of nonintervention." 12
This redefinition of the consular role (engaging in activities previ-
ously viewed as exclusive to U.S. domestic affairs) is an example of
Mexico's re-interpretation of the non-intervention norm. The barrier
between foreign and domestic concerns is not as inflexible as in the
past. This barrier has become more fluid with migrants and interests
(political, economic, and cultural) flowing across international
boundaries between U.S. and Mexican territory." 3
A third example of Mexico's reinterpretation of the norm is evi-
denced by President Vicente Fox's migrant-focused foreign policy." 1
4
110. Id. at 50.
111. Id.
112. Id.at5l.
113. Cultural forces influenced incorporation of migrants into Mexico's for-
eign policy. A consciousness rooted in past experiences with many U.S. invasions
in Mexico, the Mexican Revolution fostered a nationalism that was defensive and
anti-American. Nationwide sentiments of local pride, a defined national identity, and
recollections of distant and close histories created a situation where Mexican nation-
alism included elements of anti-Americanism. This is not to suggest any manifest or
latent hatred of U.S. civil society or the United States. Cultural feelings would often
be suspicious of U.S. intentions. Gonzdlez Guitidrrez poignantly expands on the ef-
fect of this on migrants noting that "national culture was not very sensitive to the
situation of the emigrants," and "for decades, as a country and as a government, we
forgot our emigrants, with the shameful attitude of a mother who abandoned her
children and does not want to know about them." Gonzdlez Guitidrrez, supra note
107, at 551. He adds: "Instead of promoting the image of the emigrant who goes
abroad to make good for his family and homeland, a Mexican national culture domi-
nated by collective guilt feelings made assimilation or multiculturalism synonyms
for disloyalty and treason." Id.
114. See generally Pamela Starr, U.S.-Mexico Relations, HEMISPHERE Focus
(Center for Strategic & Int'l Stud., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 9, 2004; Rafael
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Fox's presidency (2000-06) initiated a political discourse of display-
ing Mexico's redemocratization with an engaged foreign policy, based
on democracy, human rights, and multilateralism. Fox's discourse
added to Mexico's efforts to reinterpret non-intervention.15 Fox
sought the creation of a migration agreement with the United States as
a step towards Mexico's longer-term goals of foreign policy." 6 Mex-
ico initiated the migration negotiation with the United States and pri-
oritized discussion with the Department of Justice, State Department,
Office of the President, and key congressional members." 7 Mexico
presented the issue as important for U.S. domestic concerns by stress-
ing how untaxed or underground migrant labor decreased the U.S. so-
cial security tax base, how U.S. Hispanic voters would approve many
pro-migrant measures, especially a comprehensive reform measure,
and the security benefits of incorporating "undocumented" or "illegal"
foreign nationals.1 18 In April of 2001, Mexico proposed a five-part
plan, colloquially referred to as the "whole enchilada."1 '9 This plan
was comprised of temporary worker, regularization, regional devel-
opment programs, improved border security, and increased visa allot-
ments. 
120
Femndez de Castro, La Migracion Sobre la Mesa de Negociacion, in CAMBIO Y
CONTINUIDAD EN LA POLITICA EXTERIOR DE MEXICO 111, 111-129 (Rafeal
Ferndndez de Castro ed., 2002).
115. In describing Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Jorge Castaneda's for-
eign policy goals, Ambassador Heller reiterated that Mexico's six principles that-
confirm sovereignty between nations have evolved from concepts of unshared au-
thority and are increasingly shared between nations, non-state actors, and
multilateral institutions. See Claude Heller, Los Principios de la Politica Exterior a
la Luz del Contexto Internacional, in CAMBIO Y CONTINUIDAD EN LA POLITICA
EXTERIOR DE MEXICO, supra note 114, at 77-78.
116. Starr, supra note 114, at 5.
117. Femndez de Castro, supra note 114.
118. Id. at 113.
119. Starr, supra note 114, at 4; Duncan Campbell, Mexico Goes for the
Whole Enchilada, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Sep. 5, 2001, http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/elsewhere/joumalist/story/0,7792,547248,00.html.
120. The five-part proposal included: (1) a temporary worker plan in various
sectors beyond agriculture, reflecting cyclical migration trends and encompassing
between 250,000 and 350,000 workers; (2) a regularization program for undocu-
mented Mexicans in the United States-a population estimated to be near 3.5 mil-
lion people; (3) a regional development program in Mexican communities with high
emigration rates, here, the focus was on emigration caused by economic forces in
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Ultimately, these negotiations failed to reach an agreement, much
of this due to the U.S.'s changed security context after the September
11 attacks and the resulting changes in domestic political attitudes in
both countries. 2 ' The most contentious point was regularization. For
Mexico, it represented the most attractive benefit for its foreign pol-
icy.' 22  It also meant the most significant change in U.S. policy.
Regularization also presented the greatest change in non-intervention,
because it suggested the United States relinquish immigration law
claims against migrants.' 23 Likewise, negotiating this point suggested
Mexico; (4) improved border security, seeking to decrease the number of deaths suf-
fered by border crossers and to eliminate human trafficking; and (5) a revised visa
allotment made to Mexican nationals, within the existing NAFTA-TN visa frame-
work. Fernandez de Castro, supra note 114, at 122-23. The heart of the proposal
was the temporary worker program and regularization. Id. at 23. Mexico's inclu-
sion of these elements were to compliment domestic forces in the United States,
such as the AFL-CIO, Hispanic political groups, and migrant-rights groups, already
advocating for these changes. Id.; see also Starr, supra note 114, at 4.
121. See generally Rafael Fernandez de Castro, Seguridad y Migraci6n un
Nuevo Paradigma, FOREIGN AFFAIRS EN ESPANOL, Oct.-Dec. 2006,
http://www.foreignaffairs-esp.org/20061001 faenespessayO604O2/rafael-fernandez-e-
castro/seguridad-y-migracion-un-nuevo-paradigma.html?mode=print. For the
United States, immigrant issues took on a more security-focus and suspicious tone
after September 11, and its foreign policy reflects this as well. Starr, supra note
114, at 6-7. While in Mexico, the public viewed the United States' response to Sep-
tember 11 as an act of aggression against Iraq and suggestive of an imperialist for-
eign policy. Id. The United States believed Mexico was failing in its partnership
with the United States and "obstructing the United States in the U.N. on a matter of
U.S. national security." Id. Ultimately, Mexico declared that it would not have
supported the U.S. resolutions in 2003 seeking U.N. support for the invasion of Iraq.
Id. at 7. These events signified temporal disunion of the diplomatic closeness re-
garding migration shared by the two neighbors from 2000-2001. Id. at 6-7.
122. Fernndez de Castro, supra note 114, at 123-25.
123. In approving any regularization or amnesty of undocumented or illegally
present aliens the U.S. Congress is determining to forego some of the sovereign
power the United States may have. Border control and immigration law are sourced
in international sovereignty. See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AIqD AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP 11-13 (2002); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2004) (presenting foundational cases, doctrinal develop-
ment, and recent changes to the plenary power doctrine, which is sourced in interna-
tional sovereignty). Any law, whether a product of domestic lawmaking or an inter-
national treaty, that alters immigration or border functions by the United States is
thus an exercise of sovereignty. For a policy perspective, which this author does not
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that the United States, through an international agreement, would cede
its sovereign authority to determine who is legally present in the
United States. For many sectors of the U.S. public, and thus politi-
cians, regularization for any unlawfully present migrant would reward
prior immigration law violations. For U.S. politicians, including such
a provision in any international agreement or domestic legislation was
not politically viable. 1
24
An initial review of Mexico-U.S. foreign relations since Septem-
ber 2001, suggests much discord regarding migration. Importantly
though, Mexico has not returned to "no policy" on migrants in the
United States or stopped trying to influence U.S. lawmaking.1 25 The
North American neighbors have found common ground and instituted
agreements in the economic development, border security, and secu-
rity cooperation areas.1 26 Each agreement is presented as decreasing
migration pressures. Similarly, Mexico's diplomats advocate for a
migration agreement and improved treatment for migrants in the
United States. 127 These issues remain part of the bilateral discourse as
an integral part of Mexican foreign relations and an influential ele-
ment in U.S. immigration lawmaking.' 28 Border security and eco-
agree with, that a migration agreement with Mexico unwisely limits U.S. authority
and congressional power, see ROBERT S. LEIKEN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,
ENCHILADA LITE: A POST-9/11 MEXICAN MIGRATION AGREEMENT (2002), available
at http://www.cis.org/articles/200211eiken.pdf.
124. LEIKEN, supra note 123.
125. See Press Release, Embassy of Mex., Mexico's Position on the An-
nouncement of the U.S. Senate to Renew Debate on Immigration Reform (May 11,
2006), available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/eng/index.php?option=
corncontent&task=view&id=200&Itemid=67; Press Release, Embassy of Mex.,
Message from President Vicente Fox, After His Meeting with President Vicente
[sic] George W. Bush (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.embassyofmex
ico.org/eng/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id= 196&Itemid=67; Press
Release, Embassy of Mex., Migration and Security: A Shared Responsibility (Nov.
2, 2005), available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/eng/index.php?option
=comcontent&task=view&id= 155&Itemid=67.
126. This essay does not fully examine the cooperation and agreements be-
tween the United States and Mexico, as they focus on economic, security, and bor-
der policy. This essay focuses on the concept of legal determinations using sover-
eignty regarding migration.
127. See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
128. For an example of the working groups and discussions between Mexican
diplomats and U.S. counterparts, agencies, and lawmakers, see Press Release, Em-
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nomic policy fall squarely within a nation's sovereign powers. More
traditional interpretations of non-intervention, however, would iden-
tify these areas as solely within U.S. jurisdiction and off-limits to
Mexican foreign relations. Interestingly, security cooperation and re-
gional development are similar to two points contained in Mexico's
five-point proposal.1
29
A fourth example of Mexico's non-intervention reinterpretation is
how Mexican foreign policy to the United States continues to include
a variety of immigration issues. These issues include seeking a migra-
tion agreement, lobbying for comprehensive migration reform of U.S.
laws, and improved treatment of Mexican nationals in the United
States. 130 Mexican officials explain how U.S. law, whether future ef-
fects of legislation, current agency policy, or judicial decisions, harm
Mexican migrants in the United States. Examples of such harm in-
clude: Arizona's Proposition 200 (2005),13 vigilantism of the Min-
utemen on the Arizona-Sonora border since February of 2005, House
passage of the border security-and-criminalization focused Sensen-
brenner Bill (December 2005),132 and persistent requests for investiga-
tion into the deaths of migrant crossers. 133 U.S. border security policy
has pushed border-crossers to seek more dangerous and less fortified
bassy of Mex., Secretary Luis Ernesto Derbez Paid a Working Visit to Washington
(Oct. 26, 2005), available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/
eng/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=153&Itemid=67. See gener-
ally ROSENBLUM, TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 23 (presenting how U.S.
and Mexican political forces, as a two-stage process with domestic and international
concerns for both Mexican and U.S. actors, influence U.S. immigration policy).
129. See DOMiNGUEZ & FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, supra note 82, at 122-23;
Starr, supra note 114, at 4.
130. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
131. Press Release, Embassy of Mex., The Foreign Ministry of Mexico States
Its Position on Passage of Proposition 200 (Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act) in
Arizona (Nov. 3, 2004), available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/
eng/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=90&Itemid=67.
132. Press Release, Embassy of Mex., The Mexican Government Rejects the
Declarations of the California Governor Regarding the So-Called Minuteman Pro-
ject (Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/
eng/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 121 &Itemid=67.
133. Press Release, Embassy of Mex., The Mexican Government Will Inten-
sify Its Efforts to Achieve a Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Dec. 16, 2005),
available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/eng/index.php?option=com-content
&task=view&id= 156&Itemid=67.
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paths. The direct and foreseeable consequence of this policy choice is
an alarming increase in fatalities for border-crossers. 134 These deaths
total over 1,900 since 1998, when the U.S. government began count-
ing deaths, and average deaths per year are estimated at 404.135 Seek-
ing to decrease the number of deaths, Mexico issued a "Guide for
Mexican Migrants" in January of 2005, which provides safety and in-
stitutional advice for crossers. 136
A fifth example of reinterpreting the non-intervention norm took
place during the spring of 2006. As the U.S. Senate debated proposed
immigration legislation and civil society in Mexico and the United
States actively voiced its concerns in migrant advocate demonstra-
tions, Mexican foreign policy continued to advocate for Mexican mi-
grants' interests and to influence in U.S. lawmaking. In February,
Mexico presented a more nuanced immigration position in a resolu-
tion titled "Mexico and Migration Phenomenon," approved by the Ex-
ecutive and Mexico's Congress. 137 This plan stresses that migration is
a shared governmental responsibility, has domestic and international
consequences and causes, and should be regulated in coordination
with border, security, economic, and immigration policies.1 38 It em-
phasizes that current U.S. border policy forecloses many migrants re-
turning to Mexico; instead, Mexico seeks a "circular migratory flow"
134. Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling "Unwanted" Immigration: Lessons
from the United States, 1993-2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 775, 783-84
(2005) (arguing a border control focus has resulted in: a redistribution of crossing
along the Southwest border; "undocumented migrants" staying longer in the United
States; dramatic increases in migrant deaths from "clandestine border crossings;"
anti-immigrant violence on the border; and "no evidence that unauthorised [sic] mi-
gration is being deterred at the point of origin.").
135. Olga R. Rodriguez, Mexico's Migrant-Smugglers Hike Rates, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, June 14, 2006, at A19.
136. The guide was published in Spanish and English and clearly suggests mi-
grants should not use false documents and should not employ smugglers or "coyo-
tes." Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, Guide for the Mexican Migrant, 1
www.sre.gob~mx/tramites/guiamigrante/default.htm. Unfortunately, U.S. media and
policy makers classified the guide as a "comic book," ignoring the portable needs of
the intended audience and the guide's "easy to decipher" format.
137. MEXICO AND THE MIGRATION PHENOMENON (2006), available at
www.embassyofmexico.org/images/pdfs/Mexico%20and%20the%20Migration%20
Phenomenon%20%2002%2003%202006.pdf.
138. Id.
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of migrants (Mexico to the United States and back to Mexico). 139 The
resolution suggests Mexican policy options to facilitate a circular
flow.' 4° These options focus on financial incentive for returning mi-
grants in developing savings accounts, mortgages, and pension bene-
fits.14 1 Mexican officials continued to voice support, and lobby legis-
lators, for regularization and guest-worker programs to be included in
bills before Congress. 14 2 Similarly on March 20, 2006, Mexico in-
cluded full page ads in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Los
Angeles Times summarizing the resolution's main points.143
IV. CONCLUSION
For over a decade, transnational research has illuminated that, de-
spite not being solely incorporated into one national society or bound
by political or territorial borders, migrants exert important political in-
fluence in receiving and sending political systems. Labeled a "trans-
national analysis," this essay applies questions inspired from transna-
tional research to see if there has been any influence in the laws
developed to regulate migration. This analysis examines Mexico's
foreign relations law that addresses events outside its territory, such as
migration to the United States. Foreign relations law is intimately re-
lated with sovereignty because sovereignty is the source of authority
for a country's foreign relations. This transnational context is regu-
lated by a legal doctrine premised on foreclosing foreign influence:
absolute sovereignty in the norm of non-intervention. By painting a
sovereign country's authority as exclusive and independent, absolute
sovereignty squarely rejects transnational influence. This vision of
sovereignty regards domestic jurisdiction and a country's independ-
ence as barring influence by other countries.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexican Government Applauds Senate Action on
Immigration, EL HISPANIC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2006; Olga. R. Rodriguez, Mexico Opti-
mistic for Immigrant Program, BELLEVILLE NEWS DEMOCRAT, Mar. 28, 2006, at
A3.
143. Press Release, Embassy of Mex., Message From Mexico About Migration
(Mar. 20, 2006), available at http://www.embassyofmexico.org/eng/index.
php?option=com content&task=view&id= 188&Itemid=2.
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Recent developments in Mexican law suggesting there has been a
transnational influence in how sovereignty is reasoned when applying
the non-intervention norm. With this shift, Mexico stepped away
from interpreting sovereignty as absolute. With traditional sover-
eignty reasoning, Mexico interpreted non-intervention as "a policy of
no policy" regarding its migrants in the United States. Mexico viewed
the concept of sovereignty as absolute and excluded any influence by
Mexico regarding its nationals in the United States. This approach has
been reinterpreted, as evidenced by Mexico's lobbying of U.S. law-
makers for changes to IIRIRA and recent immigration proposals, ne-
gotiating a migration agreement with the United States, an extensive
Consular program to represent migrants in the United States, and ac-
tively advocating for immigration reform and improved treatment for
border crossers and migrants.
These developments are the result of a transnational influence in
sovereignty reasoning in Mexico. There is a transnational influence
because foreign policy decisions (to advocate for nationals abroad)
were made for domestic benefit and because this benefit was not de-
termined to conflict with U.S. domestic jurisdiction. The objectives of
domestic politics and foreign relations are not as clearly separated as
in the past, because migrants are abroad but have important influences
in a sending society. Traditionally, Mexican foreign relations did not
disturb U.S. jurisdiction out of concern for international sovereignty,
as protected in the Estrada Doctrine and Constitutional Article 89:X.
With the developments presented in this essay, sovereignty as cur-
rently interpreted by Mexican foreign relations readily embraces a
transnational perspective after reinterpreting international law norms,
based on sovereignty ideals, contained in domestic regimes.
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